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1 Introduction
Despite some recent efforts to ease curbs on foreign investment, China has imposed tight
regulations on foreign entry since 1990s. For instance, the ‘Catalogue for the Guidance of
Foreign Investment’ (hereafter the ‘Catalogue’) published by China’s National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission is viewed as a central policy of the Chinese government,
which asserts that foreign investment must be made in a manner that is consistent with
China’s economic policy in order to promote its economic development. Some recent
media report indicates that the Chinese government is increasingly under the pressure
to reduce restrictions on foreign investment in order to lessen the exposure to reciprocal
investment barriers. More importantly, these regulations, by generating entry barriers
and impeding competition and technological spillover among upstream industries, may
have significant depressant effects on the productivity of other Chinese industries through
the input-output linkages.
In contrast to the large body of empirical research on the impact of trade liber-
alization in China, little is known about the effects of investment liberalization which
allows greater foreign entry in both services and manufacturing sectors. This paper aims
to fill this important gap. The novelty of our paper lies mainly in the following four
aspects. First, unlike much of the literature which examines the direct effect of regula-
tion on the performance of regulated sectors, we consider the indirect impacts of foreign
entry regulation on downstream manufacturing activities in China. Modern economies
involve very sophisticated input-output structures. According to Acemoglu et al. (2006),
sectoral linkages may act as important channels through which microeconomic shocks
generate a ‘cascade effect’, i.e. in the presence of intersectoral dependence in the produc-
tion structure, idiosyncratic shocks may propagate throughout the economy and affect
the output of other sectors, generating sizable aggregate effects. Using French firm-level
data, Di Giovanni et al. (2014) show that the inter-firm linkages are approximately three
times as important as the direct effect of firm shocks in driving aggregate fluctuations.
Jones (2013) pinpoints the implications of the input-output structure of the economy for
economic growth and development, i.e. the effects of resource misallocation can be am-
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plified in the presence of input-output linkages. This is particularly relevant for China as
the world’s largest and the most dynamic developing country where firms and industries
are embedded in a complex production network. Thus, regulations that hinder foreign
access to domestic markets and unnecessarily constrain competition can be a drag on the
productivity of not only firms and industries directly concerned, but also of other firms
and industries which use the intermediate inputs from the regulated industries, thereby
generating sizable aggregate effects. This important cross-industry influence of foreign
entry regulation on productivity outcomes in China has, to the best of our knowledge,
been largely ignored in the literature.
Second, we construct a novel measure of foreign entry regulation in China, which
consists of more than 900 4-digit industries in both services and manufacturing sectors over
the period of 1997-2007. The original data is from the official ‘Catalogue’, which provides
the explicit information of Chinese government’s attitudes to foreign investment. One
challenge is that the listed sectors and product categories in the ‘Catalogue’ are not aligned
with any formal sectoral or industrial classification system. We use a unique matching
approach to link the information of foreign entry regulation from the ‘Catalogue’ with
China’s Input-Output Tables and the firm-level production data of more than 480,000
manufacturing firms. This novel and comprehensive dataset is superior to the commonly-
used OECD indicators of anti-competitive regulations on product market which cover
a small number of broadly-defined non-manufacturing industries (Bas and Causa, 2013;
Bourle`s et al., 2013; Cette et al., 2017).
Third, we investigate the trickle-down effects of foreign entry regulation imposed on
both services and manufacturing sectors on the productivity performance of downstream
manufacturing sectors in China. This is because downstream spillovers arising from policy
reform and foreign participation in the services sectors are qualitatively different from
those arising from foreign direct investment (FDI) in manufacturing industries (Arnold
et al., 2016). Despite the important role of services (such as finance, transport, and
telecommunications) used as intermediate inputs in manufacturing, there has not been
much empirical analysis of the effects of services regulation or liberalization in China.
This paper thus provides a more rigorous evidence-based analysis of the role of foreign
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entry regulation on the services sector, along with that on the manufacturing sector, in
driving the productivity outcome of downstream manufacturing industries which rely on
the intermediate inputs from the regulated sectors.
Last, in addition to the overall downstream effects of foreign entry regulation, the
focus of this paper is on various economic mechanisms that characterize the channels
through which upstream regulation on foreign entry affects the performance of firms in
downstream industries in China. In particular, we assess to what extent the productivity
effects of foreign entry regulation work through some industry-specific channels such as
the distance to the world technology frontier, the technology sharing similarity and the
labour structure similarity between upstream and downstream industries, or some firm-
specific channels such as the R&D investment and the outsourcing intensity. To the best
of our knowledge, none of the existing studies explore this important research question in
such an in-depth and comprehensive way.
We find that the overall level of foreign entry barriers in China has slightly declined
during 1997-2007. Despite vast heterogeneity among different industries, a clear pattern is
evident: there exists a significant liberalizing move in the manufacturing sector, whereas
the strict restrictions on the services sector remain intact. Regression results show that
foreign entry regulation on the upstream manufacturing and services industries curbs
downstream firm productivity due to the reduced competition, rent-seeking efficiency
incentives and technological spillovers. This cross-industry indirect effect is found to be
2.6 times as big as the direct effect of such regulation on firms’ own industries, highlighting
the role of input-output structures in amplifying the impact of foreign entry regulation
on the entire economy. The downstream effect of lack of upstream competition is more
marked for firms in industries close to the world technology frontier and sharing similar
technology or labour structure between upstream and downstream industries, and for
firms engaging more in R&D and outsourcing activities. The results are robust when
various methods are adopted to deal with the potential endogeneity and when alternative
measures of key variables are employed.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the theoretical
and empirical literature on entry regulation. Section 3 provides some background infor-
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mation on China’s FDI inflows and foreign entry regulation. Section 4 explains our data,
variables, model specification and estimation strategy. Section 5 presents some stylized
facts and discusses the results of our baseline model. Section 6 explores various economic
channels through which foreign entry regulation affects downstream productivity. Section
7 conducts a number of robustness checks, focusing on the endogeneity and alternative
measures of key variables. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Related literature
Our paper relates to a variety of theoretical and empirical literature on the direct effect
that entry regulation has on the performance of regulated sectors, the indirect effect of
such regulation on downstream manufacturing industries, and the effect of trade liberal-
ization, FDI and services liberalization.
2.1 Regulation of entry: direct effect
The economic theory of regulation dates from Pigou (1920)’s public interest theory which
argues that unregulated markets exhibit frequent failures, ranging from monopoly power
to externalities, and the government can screen new entrants to make sure that consumers
buy high quality products from desirable sellers. It predicts that stricter regulation of
entry is associated with socially superior outcomes. By contrast, the public choice theory
claims that the regulation of entry keeps out the competitors, which leads to greater
market power and profits of incumbents rather than benefits to consumers (Stigler, 1971;
Peltzman, 1976). Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that regulation is pursued for the
benefit of politicians and bureaucrats, enabling the regulators to collect bribes from the
potential entrants and serves no social purpose. Thus, the public choice theory predicts
that stricter regulation is associated with less competition and higher corruption.
There is a growing empirical literature on the effect of entry regulation on the in-
dustrial structure. For instance, Djankov et al. (2002) find that heavier regulation of entry
is associated with greater corruption and a larger size of the unofficial economy using a
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dataset of entry regulation of start-up companies in 85 countries. Alesina et al. (2005)
find that liberalization of entry has a positive impact on the industry-level capital accu-
mulation in 21 OECD countries. Klapper et al. (2006) find that costly entry regulation
hampers the creation of new firms, discriminates against small new entrants, and reduces
the growth rate of incumbent firms in the regulated industries. In brief, most evidence
favors the public choice over the public interest theories of regulation, and has been used
to justify the simplification of business start-up (Djankov, 2009).
2.2 Regulation of entry: indirect effect
In theory, there are at least three channels through which entry regulation on upstream
industries may affect the productivity of downstream firms. First, according to Bourle`s
et al. (2013), lack of competition in upstream sectors makes the search for intermediate
input suppliers time-consuming and costly for new downstream firms. Thus, anticom-
petitive regulations in upstream sectors can reduce downstream competition if access to
downstream markets requires using intermediate inputs produced upstream, which in turn
affects downstream productivity.
Second, regulations that increase suppliers’ market power can reduce incentives to
improve efficiency and curb productivity in downstream sectors even if such regulations
do not restrict market access downstream (Bourle`s et al., 2013). This is because with
imperfect competition in upstream industries, firms in downstream industries have to
negotiate terms and conditions of their contracts with suppliers and part of the rents
expected downstream from adopting best-practice techniques will be captured by inter-
mediate input providers. Hence, rent-seeking efficiency incentives in downstream sectors
are reduced by the search costs implied by imperfect competition in upstream sectors.
Cette et al. (2016) confirm that it is the rent-sharing between regulated industries pro-
ducing intermediate inputs and industries using these inputs that explains the indirect
productivity impact of upstream regulations on other industries.
Third, according to Barone and Cingano (2011), anticompetitive upstream regula-
tions may constrain the diffusion of input-intensive technologies and increase the costs
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of production in downstream industries. In other words, regulations that generate entry
barriers may slow technology transfers through intermediate markets and increase the
costs of absorbing new technologies in downstream firms and industries, thus impeding
their productivity enhancement.
Empirically, using a panel of cross-country industry-level data, Bourle`s et al. (2013)
find that anticompetitive upstream regulations significantly curb multifactor productiv-
ity growth, and the effect is stronger for observations close to the productivity frontier.
Similar results are found by Bas and Causa (2013) which explores the effect of trade
and product market policies in upstream sectors on downstream productivity in China,
and by Cette et al. (2017) which focuses on the role of R&D investment in driving the
relationship between upstream competition and downstream performance. One common
feature of these studies is that their regulation variable is based on the OECD indicators
of anti-competitive regulations on product market, where 6 non-manufacturing industries
are included in Bourle`s et al. (2013) and Cette et al. (2017), and only 3 industries are
included in Bas and Causa (2013). This leaves scope for further exploration of the impact
of upstream regulation on downstream performance by using our more comprehensive and
highly-disaggregated dataset on foreign entry regulation in China.
2.3 Foreign entry liberalization: trade, FDI and services
There is an extensive empirical literature showing that trade liberalization increases firm-
and industry-level productivity (Pavcnik, 2002; Bernard et al., 2006; Amiti and Konings,
2007; Fernandes, 2007; Aw et al., 2011; Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011; Bustos, 2011; Yu,
2015). The mechanisms are mainly through inter-firm reallocations and the productivity
improvement within incumbent firms.
Despite the fact that the economic benefits of liberalization of FDI are well es-
tablished in the theoretical literature, the empirical evidence on the effect of FDI on
technology spillovers and productivity enhancement in host countries is far from conclu-
sive (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Javorcik, 2004; Blalock and Gertler, 2008; Fu, 2011;
Xu and Sheng, 2012). The general message is that the presence of foreign firms does
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not always benefit domestic firms in developing countries and the effect depends on the
characteristics of domestic firms, industries and the host country, such as the absorptive
capacity, financial sector development, and government regulations.
There is a growing literature on the indirect effect of services liberalization on
the productivity and growth of downstream manufacturing industries (see, for instance,
Arnold et al. (2011) on Czech Republic, Barone and Cingano (2011) on OECD coun-
tries, Fernandes and Paunov (2012) on Chile, and Arnold et al. (2016) on India). The
main finding is that services liberalization, mainly characterized by the entry of foreign
providers, has a positive effect on the performance of domestic downstream manufactur-
ing firms through the reduction of production factor costs, access to higher quality or
new varieties of services inputs, and positive foreign spillovers. For instance, the entry of
technologically advanced foreign services providers may bring know-how and knowledge
about new products and international best practices into the country, which puts pres-
sure on domestic suppliers to make similar improvements, thus permitting downstream
manufacturers to introduce productivity enhancing changes.
3 China background
3.1 FDI inflows in China
FDI inflows are regarded as an important factor contributing to China’s rapid economic
growth. It was Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Southern Tour’ in the spring of 1992 that unleashed
a surge of inward FDI to China. Since then foreign firms have been allowed steadily
greater freedom to operate in China. FDI was initially attracted by Special Economic
Zones (SEZs) for export processing, but the inflows diversified in the 1990s with a large
proportion of foreign firms focusing on the domestic Chinese market. In 2013, China’s
utilized inward FDI ($117.6 Billion in total) surpassed the US as the world’s number one
destination for FDI.
In addition to its’ ‘world factory’ status by providing manufacturing products, China
made a radical commitment to services liberalization through its WTO accession in 2001.
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For instance, China has committed to open most services markets to international com-
petition from foreign services providers in the areas of distribution, telecommunications,
financial services, professional business services, accounting, law, construction and travel
etc. Figure 1 illustrates China’s FDI inflows by sectors. China has been quite open to
FDI in its manufacturing sectors; however, the services sector has not been fully liberal-
ized until recently. Since 2005, while FDI in the manufacturing sectors remains high and
stable, it is the surge of FDI in the services industries that has contributed to the recent
rise of FDI inflows to China.
Figure 1: China’s utilized inward FDI by sectors: 1997-2013 (Billion US$)
Data source: Statistical Yearbook of China (Various issues)
3.2 Foreign entry regulation in China
In 1995, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) published the
first ‘Catalogue’ to guide the foreign investment in China. It was revised in 1997, 2002,
2004, 2007, 2011 and 2014, reflecting the evolution and substantial change of the Chinese
government’s policy objectives towards foreign investment along its economic develop-
ment over the past 20 years. For instance, China’s recent 13th ‘Five-Year Economic Plan’
identifies that the current challenge for China is to attract the right kind of FDI as it
strives to rebalance its economy, improve the environment, and move up the value chain.
This goal is clearly reflected in the latest 2014 ‘Catalogue’ which aims to shift the foreign
investment away from the low value-added labour-intensive businesses and the industries
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with conventional, highly polluted or resource-intensive technology. Thus, China’s recent
FDI strategies aim to take a more selective approach, attracting the environmentally sus-
tainable, energy efficient, and technologically advanced industries in both manufacturing
and services sectors.
Generally speaking, the ‘Catalogue’ sets out the ‘encouraged’, ‘restricted’, and ‘pro-
hibited’ categories for all foreign investment projects in China. Any foreign investment
project that is not included in the ‘Catalogue’ is deemed to be ‘permitted’. The ‘en-
couraged’ category indicates where the Chinese government wishes to direct the foreign
investment, and such projects would be entitled to certain official preferential treatment
in terms of taxation, location choices and various subsidies. The ‘prohibited’ category
indicates the sectors that foreign investors are not allowed to invest in under any circum-
stances. The ‘restricted’ category implies that foreign investors are allowed to invest in
these sectors, but some conditions (such as the ownership, location choices, and business
scope etc) may apply. The ‘restricted’ projects are subject to more stringent approval
requirements in general. Lastly, the ‘permitted’ category means that foreign investors
are allowed to invest in these sectors without any subsidy or condition. A proper under-
standing of such regulation is crucial for foreign investors to take the opportunities and
to overcome potential barriers when investing in China.
Appendix Table A1 shows the number of regulated items listed in various issues
of the ‘Catalogue’, ranging from 318 items in 1997 to 477 items in 2007.1 Chinese gov-
ernment aims at gradually easing the curbs on foreign investment by expanding the list
of ‘encouraged’ items for foreign investment in all sectors. For instance, the number of
‘encouraged’ items rose from 176 to 298 in the manufacturing sector and from 3 to 41 in
the services sector during the period of 1997 to 2007. On the other hand, despite a small
decline of the number of ‘restricted’ items in the manufacturing sector (from 73 in 1997
to 48 in 2007), the corresponding figure in the services sector rose (from 25 in 1997 to 36
in 2007). The number of ‘prohibited’ items barely changed in both manufacturing and
agriculture sectors during 1997-2007, whereas the list of ‘prohibited’ items was expanded
1We use ‘items’ rather than ‘industries’ because the items listed in the ‘Catalogue’ include product
categories, industries and sectors, which do not follow the official industrial classification system in China.
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in the services sector (from 14 in 1997 to 21 in 2007). This confirms that the ‘Catalogue’
as a whole remains a significant restriction on inward FDI in China.
4 Data and empirical methodology
4.1 The datasets
In addition to the ‘Catalogue’ discussed above, we use a number of comprehensive microe-
conomic datasets, including the firm-level production data, China’s Input-Output Tables,
the product-level tariff information published by the World Trade Organization (WTO),
and a number of US datasets to construct some industry-specific indicators.
The firm-level dataset is drawn from the Annual Survey of Chinese Industrial Firms
conducted by National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) over the period of 1998-2007.
This dataset includes all State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and other types of enterprises
with annual sales of five million yuan (about $817,000) or more. These firms operate
in the manufacturing sectors and are located in all 30 Chinese provinces or province-
equivalent municipal cities. Following the standard cleaning procedures in the literature
(Brandt et al., 2012; Yu, 2015; Ding et al., 2016), our final sample includes 485,672 firms
and 1,824,089 firm-year observations.
China’s Input-Output Tables are employed to measure the inter-sectoral linkages
between upstream and downstream industries. The first Input-Output Table was jointly
published by NBS, NDRC and Ministry of Finance in 1987. It was subsequently revised
in 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2010 and 2012. Corresponding to the sample period of NBS
dataset, we adopt the 2002 and 2007 Input-Output Tables, which include 122 3-digit
industries in 2002 and 135 3-digit industries in 2007.
We obtain the tariff data from the WTO, which provides product-level tariffs at
the 6-digit HS level of all WTO member countries/regions. Following Yu (2015), we use
the average ad valorem (AV) duty in our analysis. Lastly, the NBER Manufacturing
Productivity Database (June 2013 version), the NBER Patent Database and the 2002
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National Industrial-Occupation Employment Matrix (NIOEM) published by the Bureau
of Labour Statistics (BLS) are also used to construct some industry-specific indicators.
4.2 Two important measures
4.2.1 Our measure of total factor productivity (TFP)
We calculate the TFP using the System GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) method which
estimates a Cobb-Douglas log-linear production function including fixed effects. There are
at least three justifications for our approach. First, compared with the Olley and Pakes
(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approaches, the System GMM estimator allows
us to take into account the fixed effects when modelling firm-level productivity. This is
important as firms have (unmeasured) productivity advantages that persist over time,
which need to be captured (Bartelsman and Dhrymes, 1998). Second, Van Biesebroeck
(2007) compares the sensitivity of five widely-used productivity measures using simulated
data, and claims that despite the strength and weakness of each method, the System
GMM estimator is the most robust technique when measurement errors and technological
heterogeneity are present. Third, one key assumption of the Olley and Pakes (1996)
approach is that capital is more actively responsive to unobserved productivity. This
may not be applicable to China, which is a labour-abundant economy with low labour
costs (Yu, 2015). Thus, the System GMM estimator is more appropriate when modelling
firm-level TFP in China.
In the light of these considerations, we estimate the following model:
yit = αi + αLlit + αMmit + αKkit + αT t+ ξit (1)
where y, l, m, and k refer to the logarithms of real gross output, employment, intermediate
inputs and the capital stock in firm i at time t respectively; we also include a time trend,
t, measuring the exogenous gains in TFP over time. We first estimate equation (1)
for different industries, and obtain the values of the elasticities of output with respect
to inputs (αL, αM and αK). TFP can then be calculated as the level of output that
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is not attributable to factor inputs (employment, intermediate inputs and capital), i.e.
productivity is due to efficiency levels and technical progress.
Given the absence of firm-specific price deflators, we use different industry-specific
price deflators for inputs and outputs, which are directly drawn from Brandt et al. (2012).
Our TFP measure is thus a revenue-based productivity measure (TFPR) as introduced by
Foster et al. (2008), which may capture both technical efficiency and price-cost markups.
Following Pavcnik (2002), we control for firm-specific markups with firm fixed effects in the
estimation. We use the perpetual inventory method to compute the capital stock, where
the depreciation rate of physical capital is based on firms’ reported actual depreciation
figure rather than arbitrary assumptions. In the System GMM estimation, gross output,
intermediate inputs, labour, and capital are treated as endogenous, where lagged values
of these variables are used as instruments in the first-differenced equation, and first-
differences of these variables are used as instruments in the levels equation. The Hansen
J test of over-identifying restrictions is adopted to evaluate the overall validity of the set
of instruments. In assessing whether our models are correctly specified and consistent, we
also check for the presence of second-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals in
all estimation. The estimated coefficients of the production function and the associated
TFP by industry are reported in the Appendix Table B4.
4.2.2 Our unique measure of foreign entry regulation
There are at least two main challenges when trying to identify the impact of competition
on innovation or productivity outcomes, i.e. the endogeneity of competition measure
(for instance, entry of new domestic and foreign firms is most likely not exogenous to
productivity outcomes) and the lack of direct link to policy of traditional indicators of
product market conditions such as markups or industry concentration indices (Bourle`s
et al., 2013). To address these problems, we construct a unique foreign entry regulation
indicator (FER) for more than 900 4-digit industries in both services and manufacturing
sectors over the period of 1997-2007 based on the information from the ‘Catalogue’, and
then link this measure with downstream manufacturing industries using China’s Input-
Output Tables. The main advantage of our FER indicator lies on its largely exogenous
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nature and the direct link with underlying policies.
Since the information on the regulated sectors and product categories in the ‘Cat-
alogue’ is not consistent with any formal sectoral or industrial classification system, we
firstly need to establish a link between the ‘Catalogue’ information and China’s official
list of sectoral categories, i.e. the 2002 China Standard Industrial Classification of All
Economics Activities (GB2002). We manually search the ‘key word’ of all regulated items
in the ‘Catalogue’ and then match them into the corresponding 4-digit industries under
GB2002. Then it is likely that multiple products or sectors in the ‘Catalogue’ can be
merged into one 4-digit industry. Our identification method is that one 4-digit industry
is classified as ‘prohibited’, ‘restricted’ or ‘encouraged’ if at least one product or sector in
that industry is stated on the government list of prohibition, restriction or encouragement.
If there is no matching information from the ‘Catalogue’, the corresponding industry is
classified as ‘permitted’. Thus, it is possible for one 4-digit industry to be simultaneously
marked as the status of ‘prohibited’, ‘restricted’ and ‘encouraged’.
We then construct the following two anti-competitive FER indicators. First, we
assign the value of 1 to an industry if at least one product or sector in that industry
is ‘prohibited’ on the government list of foreign entry, and 0 otherwise. This measure
is referred to as FER1. Thus, an industry with a unit value of FER1 is under strict
government regulation and has a low level of investment liberalization. Second, since
government regulation on foreign entry includes both prohibition and restriction, we assign
the value of 1 to an industry if at least one product or sector in that industry is either
‘prohibited’ or ‘restricted’ on the government list of foreign entry, and 0 otherwise. This
measure is referred to as FER2, which is broader than FER1 as it reflects two dimensions
of anti-competitive government regulation on foreign entry.
The final step is to measure the foreign entry barriers faced by downstream manu-
facturing industries. The identifying assumption is that the impact of upstream regulation
on downstream firms’ performance should be growing with the importance of upstream
regulated industries as suppliers of intermediate inputs. Thus, to capture the inter-sectoral
linkages between upstream and downstream industries, we weight the degree of foreign en-
try regulation on each upstream sector by the reliance of downstream manufacturing firms
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on each upstream manufacturing and services input. The foreign entry barrier indicator
(Barrier) for each downstream manufacturing industry is then expressed as
Barrierjt =
n∑
s=1
FERst ∗ wsj (2)
where Barrierjt is the upstream foreign entry barrier for downstream manufacturing in-
dustry j at time t; FERst refers to the FER indicator (either FER1 or FER2) of upstream
industry s at time t (where n refers to the total number of upstream industries of man-
ufacturing industry j; and t corresponds to the four waves of the ‘Catalogue’, i.e. 1997,
2002, 2004, and 2007); and the weight, wsj, is the amount of intermediate inputs sourced
from upstream industry s, expressed as a fraction of the overall inputs used by down-
stream manufacturing industry j. To compute the weight, we obtain the information
of the dependence of each manufacturing sector on the different upstream manufacturing
and services sectors from the 2002 and 2007 China’s Input-Output Tables. In other words,
for each downstream manufacturing industry, an industry-specific foreign entry barrier in-
dicator is derived by weighting each upstream industry component of the FER indicator
by the downstream industry’s reliance on those upstream industries based on the input-
output matrices. The use of industry-level information alleviates the concerns about the
simultaneity problem between the performance of an individual firm and its input usage.
The Barrier indicator takes the form of either Barrier1 or Barrier2 corresponding to
the two measures of FER (FER1 and FER2) respectively.
More information is provided in the Appendix A to establish the validity of our
new foreign entry barrier measures. First, we compare our foreign entry barrier indi-
cator (Barrier2) with the one computed using the information from the ‘OECD’s FDI
Restrictiveness Index’ by aggregating our measure to the level of 22 industries used by
the OECD Index.2 Figure A1 shows that these two foreign entry barrier measures are
highly and positively correlated. Second, Table A2 shows the proportion of foreign firms
in manufacturing industries in various years. We find that the share of foreign firms is
2The OECD Index provides the information of FDI restrictiveness of 22 industries in 62 countries
(Kalinova et al., 2010). We weight the OECD Index using the 2002 China’s Input-Output Table to
compute the corresponding foreign entry barrier.
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indeed much lower in the restricted sectors than that in the unrestricted sectors in every
year, where Barrier2 is used to make the industry classification. Both results indicate
the reliability of our new measures of foreign entry barrier.
4.3 Model specification and hypotheses
Our baseline model is specified as follows:
Ln(TFPGMMijt ) = β0 + β1Ln(Barrierjt) + β2Xijt + ηt + ξi + µijt (3)
where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of TFP of firm i in industry j at
year t based on the System GMM estimation. Ln(Barrierjt) is the natural logarithm of
upstream foreign entry barrier for downstream manufacturing industry j at time t, where
Barrierjt takes the form of either Barrier1 or Barrier2 as defined in Section 4.2.2. We
expect a negative trickle-down effect of upstream foreign entry barriers on the productivity
performance of downstream manufacturing firms due to the constraints on competition,
rent-seeking efficiency incentives and technology spillovers as discussed in Section 2.2.
Xijt consists of a number of industry-specific and firm-specific control variables.
First, in order to identify the indirect effect of foreign entry regulation on downstream
manufacturing activities, we control for the direct effect of such regulation on the produc-
tivity of firms directly concerned. Thus, the foreign entry regulation measure (FERjt)
for manufacturing industries is included and we expect a significantly negative impact on
firms’ productivity due to the public choice argument as discussed in Section 2.1.3
Second, the natural logarithm of a weighted measure of input tariffs, Ln(Tariffjt),
is included to capture the influence of trade liberalization on downstream manufacturing
firms in industry j at time t. It is computed as the weighted average of tariffs on the
intermediate goods used in the production of final goods in each manufacturing industry,
where the product-level tariffs at the 6-digit HS level are obtained from WTO and the
weights are taken from the 2002 China’s Input-Output Table. We expect a negative effect
3We do not take the natural logarithm of FER because the FER indicator consists of lots of zeros
without being weighted by the Input-Output Tables.
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of input tariffs on downstream firms’ productivity, i.e. reducing input tariffs can raise
downstream productivity through learning, variety, and quality effects as discussed in the
literature (Amiti and Konings, 2007; Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011; Yu, 2015).
Third, we include a market structure measure of upstream industries (HHIjt) to
reflect the status of domestic competition among upstream industries faced by downstream
industry j at time t. It is computed as a weighted average of the Herfindahl index4 of all
upstream manufacturing industries faced by each downstream industry j, and the weight
is taken from the 2002 China’s Input-Output Table. The justification is that net entry in
the domestic manufacturing sector accounts for over two thirds of total TFP growth in
China over the period of 1998-2007 (Brandt et al., 2012). A lower HHI suggests a higher
degree of competition in the upstream industries, which may increase downstream firms’
productivity through the input-output linkages.
Fourth, we capture ownership heterogeneity by classifying firms into SOEs (SOE),
private firms (PRIV ) and foreign firms (FIE) according to the official definition reported
in the China City Statistical Yearbooks. Despite decades of economic reforms, SOEs are
commonly found to be the least efficient with an average return on capital well below
that in the private sector (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Ding et al., 2012; Liu and Siu, 2012).
By contrast, foreign ownership is associated with both higher levels of TFP and fewer
financial constraints (Manova et al., 2015). We therefore expect a negative effect of SOE
and a positive effect of FIE on firms’ productivity.
Lastly, firm size and firm age are included to capture the effects of economies of
scale and learning-by-doing respectively. Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm
of employment, i.e. Ln(Employment)ijt. In addition to Ln(Ageijt), a quadratic term of
firm age, Ln(Age2ijt), is added to reflect the non-linear relationship between firm age and
productivity commonly found in the literature (Brouwer et al., 2005).
When examining the economic channels through which upstream foreign entry bar-
4The Herfindahl index is computed as the sum of the squared output of the four largest firms in a
4-digit manufacturing industry, normalized by the square of the industrial output.
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riers affect downstream productivity, we estimate the following equation:
Ln(TFPijt) = β0 + β1Ln(Barrierjt) + β2Ln(Barrierjt) ∗ Channel(i),jt
+β3Channel(i),jt + β4Xijt + ηt + ξi + µijt
(4)
where economic channels (Channel(i),jt) take the form of either industry-specific channels
(Channeljt) or firm-specific channels. All other control variables (Xijt) are the same as
those in equation (3).
The error term in equations (3) and (4) comprises three components: (i) the time-
specific fixed effect, ηt, accounting for possible business cycles and macroeconomic shocks
such as an appreciation of the Chinese yuan; (ii) the firm-specific fixed effect, ξi, control-
ling for any time-invariant unobserved firm-specific features such as markups; and (iii) an
idiosyncratic error term, µijt, with normal distribution µijtN(0, σ
2
ij) to control for other
unspecified factors. Our basic estimation method is the panel data fixed effect with stan-
dard errors clustered at the 4-digit industry level. Other estimation methods are adopted
as robustness checks to address the potential endogeneity issue.
5 Basic empirical results
5.1 Some stylized facts
Figure 2 illustrates the foreign entry regulation (FER) index in China for 1997, 2002,
2004 and 2007, defined as the 4-digit FER indicator as a fraction of the total number of
4-digit industries in each 2-digit industry. It reflects the proportion of 4-digit industries
in each 2-digit industry under strict foreign entry regulation. The overall index merely
drops from 21% to 18% over the period of 1997 to 2007, which does not show a significant
liberalizing move on foreign investment regulation. An interesting pattern appears when
we separate the manufacturing and services sectors: the FER index drops from 17.6% to
11.6% during 1997-2007 for the manufacturing sector, but rises from 24.2% to 28.3% for
the services sector. Thus, the foreign entry regulation has been significantly relaxed in the
manufacturing sector, especially following China’s WTO accession (from 17.6% in 1997
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Figure 2: Foreign entry regulation (FER) index in China
Note: This figure is based on the second measure of FER (FER2).
to 9.1% in 2002), whereas regulation on the services sector has become more stringent,
despite its radical commitment to service liberalization in its WTO accession.
Figure 3: Foreign entry regulation (FER) index of 6 manufacturing sectors
Figure 3 presents the FER index of six manufacturing sectors, including food and
beverage, chemical product, metal, electrical equipment, textile, and general equipment
sectors over the period of 1997-2007. The declining trend in the FER index is evident
for all these industries but with significant heterogeneity, i.e. some industries (such as
electrical equipment) exhibit a quicker and more dramatic liberalization process than the
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others (such as chemical products). There is a big reversal in 2007 in the metal industry,
where the index drops from 27% to 5% during 1997-2004, but climbs to 36% in 2007. This
is due to the introduction of new restrictive regulation on foreign investment in the non-
ferrous metal manufacturing sector in 2007, reflecting the Chinese government’s concern
of natural resource conservation.
Figure 4: Foreign entry regulation (FER) index of 6 services sectors
Figure 4 illustrates the FER index in six services sectors, including finance, com-
munication, transportation, real estate, business services, and retail sectors. The overall
regulation level is much higher in the services sectors. There is some gradual liberaliz-
ing trend on foreign investment in three sectors of transportation, business services and
finance. By contrast, the regulation becomes stricter in the other three sectors (commu-
nication, real estate and retail sectors). The communication sector can be viewed as the
most regulated industry in China, with the FER index rising from 70% in 1997 to 100%
in 2007, reflecting the new regulation that the Internet services become fully prohibited
from foreign investment in 2007. House letting agent services are also added to the re-
stricted list of foreign investment in 2007. It is the new regulation on food, electricity,
and gasoline retailing services that turns the originally lightly controlled retail sector to
a more regulated one.5
5The FER index of all 2-digit industries is provided in Appendix Table A3 which further reveals the
vast heterogeneity across various industries.
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Figure 5: Foreign entry barrier for downstream manufacturing industries
Note: This figure is based on the second measure of Barrier (Barrier2).
Figure 5 depicts our foreign entry barrier (Barrier) indicator for downstream man-
ufacturing industries, as defined in equation (2). There is a declining trend of the overall
foreign entry barrier faced by downstream industries (from 66.3% in 1997 to 52.3% in
2007). The foreign entry barrier associated with the upstream manufacturing sector drops
from 45% in 1997 to 27.3% in 2007, whereas the corresponding figure associated with the
upstream services sector rises from 15.5% to 22.5%. This confirms that China has been
quite open in its manufacturing sector in the process of investment liberalization, but its
services sector remains tightly controlled.6
5.2 The baseline results
Table 1 reports the results of baseline model of equation (3). We find that the foreign
entry barrier (Barrier) has a significantly negative effect on the productivity performance
of downstream firms, i.e. a 10 percentage point fall in upstream foreign entry barrier is
associated with a 0.2% or 0.4% increase in the productivity of downstream manufacturing
firms, when Barrier1 and Barrier2 are used respectively. Thus, when regulations restrict
the foreign entry and competition in industries that supply intermediate inputs, the in-
centives to improve efficiency are weaker in downstream industries the more intensively
these industries use the regulated products due to the reduced competition, rent-seeking
6The summary statistics and detailed definitions of all variables are provided in Appendices C and D.
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efficiency incentives and technological spillovers. The direct impact of foreign entry reg-
ulation on firms’ own (manufacturing) industry (FER) is also found to be negative and
significant, consistent with the prediction of public choice theory. When comparing the
marginal effects between direct and indirect effects in both columns (3) and (6), the indi-
rect effect appears to be 2.6 times as large as the direct effect, indicating the importance
of cross-industry influences of regulations that restrict foreign entry on the productivity
outcome of other industries through the input-output linkages.
Table 1: The effect of foreign entry barriers on downstream productivity
Barrier1 Barrier2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Barrier) -0.005** -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.068*** -0.050*** -0.042***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
FER -0.009*** -0.017***
(0.003) (0.006)
Ln(Tariff) -0.173*** -0.164***
(0.005) (0.006)
HHI -0.568*** -0.473***
-0.022 -0.028
SOE -0.162*** -0.166*** -0.164*** -0.166***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
FIE 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.031***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Ln(Employment) 0.463*** 0.462*** 0.462*** 0.461***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ln(Age) 0.202*** 0.201*** 0.203*** 0.202***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ln(Age2) -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.876 0.892 0.894 0.875 0.891 0.894
Observation 1824089 1824089 1824089 1824089 1824089 1824089
Notes: the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of TFP based on the System GMM
estimation; FER1 and Barrier1 are used in columns (1)-(3), and FER2 and Barrier2 are
used in columns (4)-(6); all year-specific and firm-specific effects are included; standard
errors are reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The effect of input tariffs on downstream firms’ productivity is significantly negative,
indicating that as importing firms become more productive (due to learning from the
foreign technology embedded in the imported inputs, higher input quality, and more
input varieties), they can pass on the benefits to other firms through sales of their goods
along the vertical production chain. The significant and negative effect of Herfindahl index
shows that tougher domestic competition (for instance, through firm entry and exit) in
the upstream sectors can stimulate productivity improvements in downstream firms which
use the intermediate inputs from their upstream suppliers via cost savings, quality and
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variety effects. Compared with the default group of private firms, SOEs have lower levels
of productivity whereas foreign firms exhibit higher productivity. Both firm size and age
have positive and significant impacts on firms’ productivity, and the effect of the latter is
found to be non-linear. In brief, all these results are consistent with the hypotheses and
predictions discussed in Section 4.3.
Table 2: The effect of foreign entry barriers in the upstream manufacturing and services
sectors on downstream productivity
Barrier1 Barrier2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Manufacturing-Barrier) -0.048*** -0.044*** -0.052*** -0.052***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ln(Services-Barrier) -0.045*** -0.036*** -0.031*** -0.032***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
R2 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.895
Observation 1824089 1824089 1824089 1824089 1824089 1824089
Notes: we report only the coefficients of key variables to save space; Ln(Manufacturing-Barrier) and
Ln(Services-Barrier) are the natural logarithm of foreign entry barriers imposed on the upstream
manufacturing sector and services sector faced by downstream industries respectively; see notes of
Table 1 for other information.
Table 2 reports the downstream effect of foreign entry barriers associated with the
upstream manufacturing sector and services sector respectively. We find that foreign entry
barriers imposed on both sectors have significantly negative effect on the productivity of
downstream manufacturers. In column (6), a 10 percentage point decrease in the foreign
entry barriers associated with the upstream manufacturing sector results in a 0.5% increase
in downstream productivity, and the corresponding figure for barriers associated with the
upstream services sector is 0.3%. Downstream spillovers arising from policy reform and
foreign participation in the services sectors are qualitatively different from those arising
from foreign investment in manufacturing industries (Arnold et al., 2016). According
to Arnold et al. (2011), allowing greater foreign entry in services industries can benefit
the downstream manufacturing sectors in three ways. First, new services may become
available through the entry of more technologically advanced services providers. Second,
services liberalization may lead to a wider availability of services that were previously
restricted to certain groups of users. Third, the reliability of existing services may improve
as a result of competition and the entry of internationally successful players. The entry
of foreign providers may play a particularly important role in realizing these benefits.
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Our results confirm these arguments and highlight the important but often ignored role
of services used as intermediate goods in manufacturing and the potential productivity-
enhancing effect of services liberalization through allowing greater foreign competition in
the services sector in China.
6 Economic channels and mechanisms
We hypothesize that there are at least five channels through which upstream foreign en-
try regulation might affect downstream performance. The three industry-specific channels
include industry’s distance to the world technology frontier, the technology sharing simi-
larity and labour structure similarity between upstream and downstream industries. The
two firm-specific channels are firms’ R&D investment and their outsourcing intensity.
6.1 Industry’s distance to the world technology frontier
The distance-to-frontier theory predicts a non-monotonic nexus between competition and
innovation (and therefore productivity) by allowing the relationship to depend on the
distance of the product to the world technology frontier (Aghion et al., 2005). For firms
far from the technology frontier, an increase in competition may discourage their incentives
to innovate because their chances of survival with new competition is limited even if they
successfully innovate, i.e. laggard firms are too far from the frontier to be able to compete
with the potentially technologically advanced new entrants (the discouragement effect).
By contrast, as firms approach the frontier, competition can increase their incentives
to innovate because competition may increase the incremental profits from innovating,
thereby encouraging firms’ R&D investments aiming at escaping competition (the escaping
competition effect). This theory is well supported by the empirical evidence.7
Since the returns to efficiency improvement are higher for firms that compete neck-
to-neck with rivals that are close to the technological frontier (Aghion et al., 2005), we
7See the cross-country evidence on economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2006), the microeconomic
evidence on industrial organization and international trade (Aghion et al., 2009; Amiti and Khandelwal,
2013; Ding et al., 2016), and the literature on the effects of anticompetitive upstream regulations on the
downstream performance (Bas and Causa, 2013; Bourle`s et al., 2013; Cette et al., 2017).
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hypothesize that protection from competitive pressure due to upstream foreign entry
barriers is likely to reduce downstream incentives to improve efficiency more markedly
when industries are close to the world technology frontier. We construct a proxy for
the distance to the technology frontier (Distance), which relates the labour productivity
of 374 4-digit Chinese manufacturing industries to their US industry equivalents, where
the US industries are used to represent the world technology frontier. We compute this
industry-level distance measure by using the 3-year moving average of US industry labour
productivity relative to labour productivity in the respective Chinese industry as follows:
Distancejpt =
LPUSjt
LPjpt
(5)
where Distancejpt is the distance of industry j in province p in China at time t relative to
its technology frontier; LPjpt is the labour productivity (defined as the value added per
worker) of industry j in province p in China at time t; and LPUSjt is the labour productivity
of industry j in the US.
The results are reported in Panel A, Table 3. We find that the coefficient of foreign
entry barrier itself is significantly negative whereas the coefficient of the interaction term
between the Distance measure and the Barrier indicator is significantly positive. Taking
column (6) as an example, for firms in industries that are far away from the frontier, the
average net elasticity with respect to upstream foreign entry barrier is -0.0378, i.e. a 10
percentage point fall in upstream foreign entry barrier is associated with a 0.37% increase
in the productivity of downstream manufacturing firms; whereas for firms in industries
close to the frontier, a 10 percentage point decrease in such barrier results in a 0.43%
increase in downstream productivity. The negative and significant coefficient of Distance
itself indicates the presence of convergence effect, i.e. a faster productivity catch-up for
firms in industries that are far from the frontier. Thus, consistent with the predictions
of neo-Schumpeterian framework, the downstream effect of foreign entry barrier is bigger
for those manufacturing firms in industries close to the world technological frontier.
8The formula is -0.043+0.002*2.8, where 2.8 is the mean value of Ln(Distance).
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6.2 Technology sharing similarity and labour structure similar-
ity among industries
Another two industry-specific features (technology sharing similarity and labour structure
similarity) may affect the relationship between foreign entry regulation and downstream
performance. Both features relate to the intellectual or technology spillovers, i.e. the
technologically-advanced foreign entry in upstream industries may speed the flow of new
technology to downstream manufacturing industries through intermediate markets.
Table 3: The industry-specific channels
Barrier1 Barrier2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. The industries’ distance to the world technology frontier
Ln(Barrier) -0.088*** -0.052*** -0.057*** -0.064*** -0.042*** -0.043***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ln(Barrier)∗Ln(Distance) 0.035*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Ln(Distance) -0.012** -0.074*** -0.081*** -0.079*** -0.113*** -0.122***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R2 0.882 0.895 0.896 0.883 0.895 0.897
Observation 1650634 1650634 1650634 1650634 1650634 1650634
Panel B. The technology sharing similarity among industries
Ln(Barrier) -0.078*** -0.075*** -0.076*** -0.070*** -0.068*** -0.069***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ln(Barrier)∗TS -0.499*** -0.483*** -0.486*** -0.073*** -0.069*** -0.070***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
TS 2.311*** 2.298*** 0.301*** 0.583*** 0.579*** 0.580***
(0.049) (0.046) (0.048) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
R2 0.875 0.892 0.894 0.876 0.893 0.894
Observation 1754107 1754107 1754107 1754107 1754107 1754107
Panel C. The labour structure similarity among industries
Ln(Barrier) -0.095*** -0.114*** -0.117*** -0.113*** -0.135*** -0.159***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Ln(Barrier)∗LS -0.072*** -0.103*** -0.093*** -0.029*** -0.075*** -0.120***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010 (0.008 (0.007 (0.008)
LS 0.388*** 0.485*** 0.770*** 0.339*** 0.388*** 0.762***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.036) (0.018) (0.015) (0.004)
R2 0.896 0.911 0.913 0.896 0.911 0.912
Observation 1714971 1714971 1714971 1714971 1714971 1714971
Notes: we report only the coefficients of key variables to save space; the table structure is the same
as Table 1 where columns (1) and (4) do not include any control variables, columns (2) and (5)
include only firm-specific control variables, and columns (3) and (6) includes all firm-specific and
industry-specific control variables; see notes of Table 1 for other information.
First, we hypothesize that such benefits may be better reaped by firms in the in-
dustries sharing similar technology, i.e. firms in industries using similar technology have
better opportunity to exploit the intermediate inputs with superior quality or advanced
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technology from their foreign providers. Following Ellison et al. (2010), we construct a
technology sharing similarity (TS) indicator which measures the extent to which technolo-
gies associated with industry j cite technologies associated with industry s, and vice versa.
The patent citation information is drawn from the 1988-1997 NBER Patent Database,
which is then matched with China’s 2002 Input-Output Table. Thus, the technology
sharing similarity between upstream industry s and downstream industry j (TSsj) is
TSsj =
n∑
s=1
Patentsj ∗ wsj (6)
where Patentsj is the patent citation number between upstream industry s and down-
stream industry j; and wsj is the weight measured by the amount of intermediate inputs
sourced from upstream industry s, expressed as a fraction of the overall inputs used
by downstream manufacturing industry j. This technology sharing similarity variable
is introduced to shed light on the importance of exchanging technology and intellectual
spillovers between upstream and downstream industries.
Second, technology spillover from upstream to downstream industries may be facili-
tated by the fact that industries use similar type of workers, i.e. efficient transfer or use of
advanced technology from foreign providers in upstream industries requires downstream
workers with similar capacity or skills to master its tacit elements. Following Ellison et al.
(2010), we measure the extent to which industries use similar types of labour through
the occupational employment patterns across industries catalogued in the 2002 National
Industrial-Occupation Employment Matrix (NIOEM) published by the Bureau of Labour
Statistics (BLS). We first compute the fraction of industry j’s employment in occupation
o (Sharejo). The similarity of employments in industry s and industry j (Laboursj) is
measured by the correlation of shareso and sharejo across occupations. Thus, the labour
structure similarity between upstream industry s and downstream industry j (LSsj) is
LSsj =
n∑
s=1
Laboursj ∗ wsj (7)
where wsj is obtained from the 2002 China’s Input-Output Table, capturing downstream
industry j’s dependence on intermediate inputs from upstream industry s.
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The results of these two channels are presented in Panels B and C, Table 3. Both
the coefficients of foreign entry barrier and the interaction terms between the TS (or
LS) and the Barrier indicator are significantly negative, indicating that the productivity
effect of foreign entry barrier is larger for downstream firms in industries using similar
technology or labour structure with their upstream industries. Thus, liberalization of
foreign investment in upstream industries (a reduction of Barrier) can provide more
benefits to firms in downstream industries sharing similar technology or labour structure,
as they have better chances to exploit the superior foreign intermediate inputs.
6.3 Two firm-specific channels: R&D investment and outsourc-
ing intensity
Firms’ R&D investment can be a vital channel through which upstream foreign entry
barriers affect downstream productivity. Investment liberalization in upstream indus-
tries offers an opportunity for downstream firms to exploit the superior intermediates
which allow firms to increase their efficiency and competitiveness. Since some knowl-
edge/technology is tacit and difficult to acquire unless the firm is directly involved in
R&D in this area, we hypothesize that firms which actively engage in R&D investment
may better reap these benefits due to absorptive capacity. We test this hypothesis by
interacting a R&D dummy (R&D) with the upstream foreign entry barrier indicator.9
The results are presented in Panel A, Table 4. We find that R&D itself has a sig-
nificantly positive impact on firm productivity. This might be due to the development of
absorptive capacity, as it permits the identification, assimilation and exploitation of inno-
vations made by other firms. Another explanation is that R&D investment may generate
process innovations that allow existing products to be produced with greater efficiency
(through lower costs). The interaction term between R&D and foreign entry barrier indi-
cator is negative and significant, indicating that firms engaging in R&D investment can
better reap the benefits of an easing of the foreign entry barriers in upstream industries.
Firms’ outsourcing behavior can also affect the link between foreign entry barri-
9We define a R&D dummy which is equal to 1 if the value of R&D is great than 0, and 0 otherwise.
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ers and downstream productivity. Outsourcing refers to the process of transferring some
manufacturing and related services tasks to other companies. The ‘make-or-buy’ deci-
sion is fundamental to industrial organization, i.e. a producer must decide whether to
undertake the activity in-house or to rely on market forces and purchase the input or
services from the outside (Grossman and Helpman, 2002). There is a trade-off between
internalizing and outsourcing. On the one hand, the TFP of manufacturing firms which
outsource their production and service tasks to more productive contract manufacturer
or service providers can be accelerated through the specialization effect. For instance,
the local suppliers might be highly specialized with particular expertise in the activity,
which reduces the overall production costs of manufacturing firms seeking out the lowest
cost suppliers. On the other hand, too much outsourcing may involve significant transac-
tion costs, imperfect information and contractual incompleteness, which leads to market
failures affecting the contractual relationship with the supplier.
Table 4: The firm-specific channels
Barrier1 Barrier2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. The R&D investment
Ln(Barrier) -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.017*** -0.025*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ln(Barrier)∗R&D -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.042*** -0.035*** -0.029***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
R&D 0.105*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.085*** 0.052*** 0.053***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
R2 0.898 0.912 0.912 0.898 0.912 0.912
Observation 1219093 1219093 1219093 1219093 1219093 1219093
Panel B. The outsourcing intensity
Ln(Barrier) -0.013*** -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.055*** -0.075*** -0.069***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ln(Barrier)∗Ln(Outsourcing) -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.019** -0.017** -0.016**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Ln(Outsourcing) -0.075*** -0.076*** -0.072*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.016***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.877 0.894 0.894 0.877 0.894 0.894
Observation 1822175 1822175 1822175 1822175 1822175 1822175
Notes: we report only the coefficients of key variables to save space; see notes of Tables 1 and 3 for
other information.
Since outsourcing extends the linkages among industries, we hypothesize that the
downstream effect of foreign entry barriers is more marked for firms with high outsourcing
intensity. We define outsourcing intensity, Ln(Outsourcing), as the natural logarithm of
firms’ intermediate inputs as a share of total output. The results are reported in Panel B,
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Table 4. The effect of outsourcing itself on firms’ productivity is found to be significantly
negative, suggesting that the market failure effect dominates the benefits of outsourcing as
discussed above. This is not entirely surprising, given that the hold-up problem emerging
from incomplete contracts or various agency costs arising from asymmetric information
can be prevalent in a transition economy like China. The negative and significant interac-
tion term between outsourcing intensity and the foreign entry barrier indicator confirms
our view that firms’ outsourcing behaviour intensifies the linkages between upstream and
downstream industries and thus magnifies the downstream effect of foreign entry barriers.
7 Further robustness checks
7.1 Endogeneity
Despite the largely exogenous nature of our policy variable on foreign entry regulation,
endogeneity can arise from the following three causes. First, lobbyism can make policies
endogenous (Bourle`s et al., 2013). For instance, low productivity firms may have incen-
tives to exert political pressures for raising anti-competitive regulations on foreign entry
in order to protect their existing market shares and rents. Second, if the foreign entry
policy is endogenous to changes in the overall economic conditions, then the causality
between the policy and performance may run in both directions. This might be the case
for China, as reflected by the frequent revision of foreign entry regulation according to its
economic development. Third, endogenous bias might arise as a direct consequence of the
way the policy variables are computed. For instance, industry productivity may affect the
input weights, thus making the policy variables endogenous; also, China’s input-output
matrices may be highly related to domestic policies.
We adopt three methods to deal with the problem of endogeneity, namely the
Instrumental Variable (IV) approach, the Difference-in-Difference (DID) approach and
an alternative weight using the US Input-Output Table to construct the foreign entry
barrier indicator. The results are presented in Table 5.
First, inspired by Arnold et al. (2016), we use India’s measure of anti-competitive
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regulations on product market from the OECD dataset (IV -India) as an instrument for
our foreign entry barrier variable. The justification is that China and India are close
competitors, so that India’s market-opening commitments are likely to have influence on
China’s foreign entry policy. In Panel A, Table 5, the first-stage regression results show
a positive and significant correlation between China and India’s market-opening policy.
The second-stage results confirm the exogenous role of foreign entry barrier in dampening
the productivity of downstream manufacturing firms in China. The highly significant
statistics of Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests suggest the rejection of the null hypothesis
of exogeneity for the foreign entry barrier indicator. The Hausman test rejects the null
hypothesis that there is no systematic difference between the OLS and IV estimators,
implying that our IV specification is appropriate and the selected instruments are valid.
Table 5: The endogeneity tests
Barrier1 Barrier2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. The Instrumental Variable (IV) approach
Ln(Barrier) -1.396*** -1.233*** -0.478*** -0.972*** -0.755*** -0.787***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
Durbin χ2 test 14801.9*** 10831.6*** 11125.5*** 1819.6*** 192.3*** 21336.1***
Wu-Hausman F test 14938.4*** 10919.1*** 11192.3*** 1816.4*** 153.2*** 21593.1***
Hausman test 14801.3*** 276624.5*** 79382.1*** 7342.1*** 199666.3*** 2618.5***
Observation 1824089 1824089 1824089 1824089 1824089 1824089
First-Stage Regressions
IV-India 0.156*** 0.128*** 0.329*** 0.212*** 0.214*** 0.178***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Panel B. The Difference-in-Difference approach
Treatment 0.043*** 0.031** 0.046***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Treatment∗Post 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.005**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Index 0.245*** 0.236*** 0.296***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Index∗Post 0.008** 0.033*** 0.025**
(0.004) (0.012) (0.013)
Post 0.154*** 0.124*** 0.083*** 0.159*** 0.120*** 0.063***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
R2 0.93 0.938 0.938 0.927 0.934 0.934
Observation 158682 158682 158682 223060 223060 223060
Panel C. Using the US Input-Output Table to compute the Barrier measure
Ln(BarrierUS) -0.016*** -0.022*** -0.029*** -0.056*** -0.068*** -0.069***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
R2 0.876 0.892 0.895 0.875 0.893 0.894
Observation 1822175 1822175 1822175 1822175 1822175 1822175
Notes: we report only the coefficients of key variables to save space; the null hypothesis of the Durbin and
Wu-Hausman tests of endogeneity is that the variable under consideration can be treated as exogenous;
the null hypothesis of the Hausman specification test is that there is no systematic difference between
the two estimators; see notes of Tables 1 and 3 for other information.
31
Second, we adopt the DID approach to estimate the productivity effect of foreign
entry barriers on downstream manufacturing firms. There was a significant liberalizing
move on China’s foreign entry regulation in 2002 (mainly in the manufacturing sector)
following its WTO accession, as shown in Figures 2 and 5. We therefore select 2002 as the
benchmark to examine the effect of this policy change on downstream firms’ productivity
over the period of 2001-03.10 We first construct a 2002 reform index for each upstream
industry which records the proportion of 4-digit industries that are exposed to the 2002
policy change of investment liberalization in each 3-digit industry in the Input-Output
Table. For instance, a 3-digit upstream industry s has m ‘restricted’ or ‘prohibited’ 4-
digit sectors in 2001 (according to the 1997 ‘Catalogue’), and n of them are changed to
the status of being ‘permitted’ or ‘encouraged’ after 2002, then the degree of the 2002
investment liberalization of this upstream industry s is n/m. An index of the effect of
2002 reform on downstream industries (Index) is computed by weighting this measure
with the information from China’s Input-Output Table.
We report the results of two variants of the DID approach in Panel B, Table 5. The
first method is to select the top 1/3 observations of this index as the treatment group,
and the bottom 1/3 observations as the control group. The treatment group dummy
(Treatment) is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the treatment group, and 0 otherwise.
We also define a time dummy (Post) which takes the value of 1 for year 2002 and 2003, and
0 for year 2001. We find that the coefficient of the interaction term between the treatment
group and the time dummy is positive and significant, indicating that the foreign entry
liberalization in 2002 improves the productivity of downstream firms. Inspired by Rajan
and Zingales (1998) and Nunn (2007), we include directly the index of the effect of 2002
reform on downstream industries (Index) and interact it with the time dummy (Post).
The positive and significant interaction term of the second approach echos the previous
finding of the productivity-enhancing effect of investment liberalization in 2002.
Lastly, the 2002 US Input-Output Table (including 369 industries) is used to con-
struct an alternative set of input weights for the foreign entry barrier indicator (BarrierUS).
On the one hand, the US input-output coefficients may reflect technological differences
10This time span is selected because another ‘Catalogue’ was released (a new policy change) in 2004.
32
rather than country-specific determinants. On the other hand, it is not correlated with
Chinese firm and industry characteristics. The results are reported in Panel C, Table 5
and our main findings remain intact.
7.2 Other robustness tests
Table 6: Other robustness tests
Panel A. An alternative measure of TFP based on Olley and Pakes (1996) approach
Barrier1 Barrier2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Barrier) -0.075*** -0.065*** -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.083*** -0.097***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
R2 0.822 0.822 0.824 0.821 0.822 0.822
Observation 1824089 1824089 1824089 1824089 1824089 1824089
Panel B. An alternative measure of foreign entry barrier
Ln(TFPGMM ) Ln(TFPOP )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Barrier3 -0.046*** -0.065*** -0.063*** -0.037*** -0.032*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
R2 0.876 0.892 0.893 0.821 0.821 0.823
Observation 1824089 1824089 1824089 1794069 1794069 1794069
Panel C. The direct effect of foreign entry
Foreign share (value added) Foreign share (employment)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign share 0.073*** 0.077*** 0.057*** 0.099*** 0.102*** 0.087***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
R2 0.877 0.893 0.893 0.877 0.893 0.894
Observation 1824089 1824089 1824089 1824089 1824089 1824089
Note: we report only the coefficients of key variables to save space; the dependent
variable in Panel A is the natural logarithm of TFP based on the Olley and Pakes
(1996) approach; the dependent variable in Panel B is the natural logarithm of TFP
based on either the System GMM estimation (TFPGMM ) or the Olley and Pakes
(1996) method (TFPOP ); the dependent variable in Panel C is the natural logarithm
of TFP based on the system GMM estimation; see notes of Tables 1 and 3 for other
information.
We compute some alternative measures of key variables as further robustness tests.
Firstly, we construct another measure of TFP using the semi-parametric Olley and Pakes
(1996) approach (TFPOP ). This method is useful to alleviate both the selection bias and
simultaneity bias (between input choices and productivity shocks). Another advantage of
Olley-Pakes method is the flexible characterization of productivity, which only assumes
that it evolves according to a Markov process (Van Biesebroeck, 2007). The results are
reported in Panel A, Table 6 and our results remain robust.
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Secondly, we construct a new measure of foreign entry regulation, as neither FER1
nor FER2 captures the information of the ‘encouragement’ policy in the ‘Catalogue’. To
deal with this problem, we assign the value of 2 to the ‘prohibited’ items, the value of
1 to the ‘restricted’ items, and the value of -1 to the ‘encouraged’ items in each 4-digit
industry. The corresponding foreign entry regulation indicator of an industry (FER3)
is the sum of values of all items in this industry. Crossing FER3 with the intensity of
intermediate input use calculated from national input-output matrices, we obtain the new
measure of foreign entry barrier (Barrier3) faced by downstream firms. Panel B, Table 6
presents the results of this new measure and our key findings remain intact.
Thirdly, there is some concern that the policy information from the ‘Catalogue’
may not fully reflect the situation of foreign entry regulation or corresponding barriers
in China. For instance, some rules and laws on foreign entry which are not officially
recorded in the ‘Catalogue’ may actually exist and are implemented by local govern-
ments. To tackle this potential criticism, we estimate the direct effect of foreign entry on
downstream firms’ productivity in Panel C, Table 6, where Foreign share is the weighted
share of foreign firms in total value added or employment of each upstream industry, and
the weight is given by the amount of intermediate inputs sourced from each upstream in-
dustry expressed as a fraction of the overall inputs used by the downstream manufacturing
industry. We find a positive and significant effect of foreign entry on downstream firms’
productivity for both measures of foreign share. This confirms our earlier findings that
the anti-competitive foreign entry regulations or barriers on the upstream industries curb
downstream productivity, and investment liberalization, on the other hand, is conducive
to the productivity gains.
Lastly, according to Arnold et al. (2011), one advantage of using the firm-level
dataset is to pinpoint the effect on domestic firms, which is of high interests to national
policy makers. For this reason, we estimate the baseline model for the sample of domestic
firms only, and our results remain robust. To save space, the results are not reported but
available upon request.
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8 Conclusion
Entry barriers are argued to be the most effective instrument for restricting competition
(Djankov et al., 2002; Klapper et al., 2006). According to Aghion et al. (2009), foreign
entry can induce reallocation of inputs and outputs, trigger knowledge spillovers, and
affect innovation and productivity of incumbent firms. We examined the trickle-down
effect of upstream foreign entry barriers on the productivity of downstream manufacturing
firms.
By making the assumption that the impact of foreign entry regulation is more pro-
nounced in manufacturing sectors relying more heavily on manufacturing and services
inputs, we built an indicator of the foreign entry barrier for downstream industries by
crossing the upstream foreign entry regulation measure with the intensity of intermedi-
ate input use calculated from national input-output matrices. We found that foreign
entry regulations on the upstream manufacturing and services industries have powerful
depressing effects on downstream productivity, and the relationship depends on a number
of industry- and firm-specific features.
Our findings have important policy implications for both the Chinese governments
and foreign investors. For instance, some recent policy reports have highlighted the in-
creasing concerns by foreign investors over restrictive government policies in China. Our
results indicate that removing any remaining entry restrictions on upstream industries
could bring substantive productivity gains and benefits to not only firms producing in
these industries but also those using inputs from these industries. In particular, we find
that most barriers to foreign investment today are not on goods but on the services sec-
tors, which strengthens the argument for further liberalization of services industries and
opening of services sectors to foreign providers. Our urgent call for services liberaliza-
tion is consistent with China’s recent policy of developing a modern services industry in
order to maintain its growth momentum. This research also highlights the importance
of complementary labour and product market reforms in order to improve the resource
allocation efficiency by reallocating resources to more technologically developed and R&D
intensive sectors where firms respond more positively to trade and services liberalization.
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Appendix A Additional information of our measures
of foreign entry regulation and barrier
Table A1: Number of regulated items in various issues of ‘Catalogue for the Guidance of
Foreign Investment’
1997 2002 2004 2007
E R P E R P E R P E R P
Agriculture 6 4 3 11 2 3 11 2 3 12 3 3
Manufacturing 176 73 14 216 41 14 209 41 14 298 48 15
Services 3 25 14 35 32 18 36 35 17 41 36 21
Total 185 102 31 262 75 35 256 78 34 351 87 39
Notes: ‘E’ refers to the ‘encouraged’ items; ‘R’ refers to the ‘restricted’ items, and
‘P’ refers to the ‘prohibited’ items.
Table A2: Proportion of foreign firms in manufacturing industries
Number of foreign firms Number of all firms Foreign share (%)
1998
Restricted Industries 5089 37331 13.6
Unrestricted Industries 20819 110940 18.8
2002
Restricted Industries 2805 19996 14.0
Unrestricted Industries 30915 145502 21.2
2004
Restricted Industries 4573 31933 14.3
Unrestricted Industries 51437 226474 22.7
2007
Restricted Industries 5333 38085 14.0
Unrestricted Industries 60470 273356 22.1
Notes: the information comes from the NBS firm-level dataset; industry classification is based on the
measure of Barrier2, where Restricted Industries are those Barrier2=1 and unrestricted Industries
are those Barrier2=0.
1
Figure A1: Correlation between two foreign entry barrier measures
Note: the vertical axis is the foreign entry barrier measure computed based on the information
from the ‘Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment’ (Barrier2); the horizontal axis
is the foreign entry barrier measure computed based on the information from OECD’s FDI
Restrictiveness Index; the year is 2003 which is the first available year of OECD Index; results
for Barrier1 and other years are similar and available upon request.
2
Table A3: The FER index of each 2-digit industry in China (%)
Manufacturing (code) 1997 2002 2004 2007 Services (code) 1997 2002 2004 2007
13 20 17.65 17.65 5.88 51 0 40 40 40
14 5.26 5 5 0 52 40 40 40 40
15 66.67 23.08 30.77 30.77 53 20 0 0 0
16 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 54 66.67 66.67 66.67 66.67
17 10 9.52 9.52 4.76 55 66.67 33.33 33.33 33.33
18 0 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 0
19 10 0 0 0 57 50 50 50 50
20 0 0 0 0 58 0 0 0 0
21 0 0 0 0 59 100 100 100 100
22 40 16.67 16.67 16.67 60 71.43 85.71 85.71 100
23 60 20 20 20 61 0 0 0 0
24 0 0 0 0 62 0 0 0 0
25 25 25 25 75 63 4.17 22.92 22.92 27.08
26 23.33 17.14 17.14 14.29 65 2.22 15.56 15.56 13.33
27 16.67 28.57 28.57 28.57 66 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33
28 28.57 14.29 14.29 14.29 67 0 0 0 0
29 22.22 33.33 33.33 22.22 68 66.67 66.67 66.67 66.67
30 0 0 0 0 69 75 25 25 25
31 10 0 0 0 70 100 100 100 100
32 0 0 0 0 71 66.67 66.67 66.67 50
33 33.33 16.67 16.67 50 72 25 25 25 50
34 16.67 4.17 4.17 4.17 73 0 100 100 0
35 9.68 6.06 6.06 6.06 74 20 10 15 15
36 11.9 17.65 19.61 19.61 75 0 0 0 20
37 26.09 0 0 11.11 76 10 30 20 20
39 25 0 0 3.57 77 0 0 0 0
40 18.75 9.52 9.52 9.52 78 20 40 40 40
41 8 0 0 4 79 0 0 0 0
42 41.67 13.33 13.33 33.33 80 25 25 25 25
81 20 0 20 20
82 0 0 0 11.11
83 0 0 0 0
84 76.92 23.08 23.08 30.77
85 100 100 100 100
86 0 0 0 0
87 0 0 0 0
88 85.71 85.71 85.71 100
89 100 100 80 80
90 0 0 0 10
91 0 0 0 66.67
92 25 25 25 100
Notes: the FER index illustrates the proportion of regulated 4-digit industries in each 2-digit industry; manufacturing industries include: 13:
Processing of food from agriculture products; 14: Manufacture of foods; 15: Manufacture of beverages; 16: Manufacture of tobacco; 17: Manufacture
of textiles; 18: Manufacture of textiles apparel, footwear and headgear; 19: Manufacture of leather, fur, feather (velvet) and related products; 20:
Processing of timber, manufacture of wood, bamboo, rattan, palm and straw products; 21: Manufacture of furniture; 22: Manufacture of paper and
paper products; 23: Printing and reproduction of recorded media; 24: Manufacture of articles for culture, education and sport activity; 25: Processing
of petroleum, coking, processing of nuclear fuel; 26: Manufacture of chemical raw materials and chemical products; 27: Manufacture of medical and
pharmaceutical products; 28: Manufacture of chemical fibers; 29: Manufacture of rubber; 30: Manufacture of plastics; 31: Manufacture of non-
metallic products; 32: Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals; 33: Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals; 34: Manufacture of metal products;
35: Ordinary machinery products; 36: Special purpose equipment products; 37: Transport equipment products; 39: Electric equipment and machinery
products; 40: Telecommunication equipment , computer and other electronic products; 41: Manufacture of measuring instruments and machinery
for cultural activity and office work; 42: Manufacture of artwork and other manufacturing; services industries include: 51: Railway transport; 52:
Road transport; 53: Urban public transport; 54: Water transport; 55: Air transport; 56: Pipeline transport; 57: Loading ,unloading, removal, and
other transport services; 58: Storage; 59: Postal services; 60: Telecommunications and other information transfer services; 61: Computer services; 62:
Software; 63: Wholesale trade; 65: Retail trade; 66: Accommodation; 67: Catering; 68: Banking; 69: Securities; 70: Insurance; 71: Other financial
activities; 72: Real estate; 73: Leasing; 74: Commercial services; 75: Research and experimental development; 76: Polytechnic services; 77: Scientific
exchange and distribution; 78: Geological prospecting; 79: Water management (conservancy); 80: Environmental management; 81: Management of
public facilities; 82: Resident services; 83: Other service activities; 84: Education; 85: Health care; 86: Social insurance; 87: Social welfare; 88: News
and publishing; 89: Radio , television, film, and audiovisual media; 90: Culture and arts; 91: Sports and 92: Entertainment.3
Appendix B TFP estimates
Table B4: TFP Estimates using the system GMM approach
Chinese Industry Estimated Coefficients Tests (p-value) TFP Std. Dev.
Labor Capital Materials AR(2) Hansen
13 0.059 0.127 0.86 0.279 0.928 7.333 1.727
14 0.207 0.119 0.887 0.231 0.937 9.316 2.719
15 0.088 0.099 0.778 0.316 0.947 6.779 1.582
16 0.189 0.07 0.71 0.722 0.952 7.317 1.868
17 0.05 -0.045 0.81 0.377 0.938 6.782 1.546
18 0.046 0.165 0.892 0.425 0.971 8.299 1.622
19 0.207 0.082 0.718 0.558 0.392 5.539 2.475
20 0.149 0.071 0.775 0.519 0.577 6.571 1.951
21 0.154 0.091 0.76 0.182 0.871 6.632 2.199
22 0.025 0.174 0.897 0.191 0.182 6.764 2.153
23 0.384 0.096 0.772 0.327 0.933 8.414 2.685
24 0.181 0.131 0.688 0.533 0.842 5.752 1.343
25 0.155 0.254 0.668 0.421 0.258 6.485 1.221
26 0.165 0.088 0.753 0.819 0.173 5.733 1.351
27 0.179 0.13 0.69 0.613 0.834 6.739 1.496
28 0.306 0.103 0.71 0.134 0.727 6.428 1.44
29 0.273 0.113 0.65 0.212 0.914 5.998 1.501
30 0.209 0.083 0.632 0.652 0.573 5.592 1.69
31 0.155 0.18 0.574 0.473 0.298 6.665 1.253
32 0.265 0.112 0.684 0.442 0.473 6.385 1.748
33 0.18 0.153 0.693 0.573 0.218 6.295 1.605
34 0.166 0.026 0.651 0.271 0.993 6.599 1.72
35 0.166 0.186 0.762 0.392 0.471 7.789 1.668
36 0.267 0.131 0.648 0.412 0.528 6.109 1.457
37 0.107 0.041 0.786 0.317 0.388 5.991 1.292
39 0.31 0.144 0.677 0.289 0.911 7.497 1.614
40 0.311 0.184 0.504 0.358 0.467 6.014 1.745
41 0.203 0.196 0.673 0.247 0.657 5.67 1.557
42 0.238 0.176 0.735 0.275 0.372 5.777 1.348
Notes: industry code corresponds to the 2002 2-digit China Standard Industrial Classification
(CSIC) code, GB2002.
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Appendix C Summary statistics
Table C5: Summary statistics of all variables used in the paper
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Variables used in the baseline model
Ln(TFPGMM ) 1824089 8.637 1.326 -2.852 16.615
Ln(Barrier1) 4220 -2.361 0.77 -4.177 -0.209
Ln(Barrier2) 4220 -0.598 0.378 -2.329 -0.044
FER1 4220 0.018 0.132 0.000 1.000
FER2 4220 0.131 0.333 0.000 1.000
Ln(Tariff) 4220 1.901 0.457 0.718 3.383
HHI 4220 0.080 0.057 0.000 0.401
SOE 1824089 0.100 0.300 0.000 1.000
FIE 1824089 0.208 0.406 0.000 1.000
Ln(Employment) 1824089 4.785 1.125 2.079 12.145
Ln(Age) 1824089 2.019 0.911 0.000 3.913
Ln(Age2) 1824089 4.906 4.216 0.000 7.827
Variables used in various economic mechanisms and the robustness checks
Ln(Manufacturing-Barrier1) 4220 -3.266 0.972 -5.503 -0.553
Ln(Manufacturing-Barrier2) 4220 -1.139 0.663 -4.178 -0.236
Ln(Services-Barrier1) 4220 -3.469 0.537 -4.981 -2.204
Ln(Services-Barrier2) 4220 -1.944 0.297 -3.044 -1.293
Ln(Distance) 3727 2.802 0.622 0.478 5.957
TS 408 0.100 0.102 0.005 0.530
LS 387 0.594 0.160 0.057 0.835
R&D 1219093 0.114 0.318 0.000 1.000
Ln(Outsourcing) 1822175 -0.319 0.336 -15.07 5.263
IV-India 4220 0.231 0.162 0.057 0.866
Treatment 280 0.500 0.501 0.000 1.000
Index 422 0.172 0.189 0.009 0.372
Ln(BarrierUS) 4220 -0.621 0.379 -2.219 -0.038
Ln(TFPOP ) 1794069 2.285 1.449 -2.588 10.162
Barrier3 4220 0.150 0.369 -0.751 1.694
FER3 4220 -0.128 0.594 -1.000 2.500
Foreign share (value added) 4220 0.191 0.093 0.000 0.675
Foreign share (employment) 4220 0.141 0.085 0.000 0.629
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Appendix D Variable definitions
Ln(TFPGMM): the natural logarithm of firms’ TFP based on the System GMM estima-
tion;
Ln(Barrier1) and Ln(Barrier2): the natural logarithm of two measures of overall foreign
entry barrier faced by downstream industries;
FER1 and FER2: the two measures of foreign entry regulation in the manufacturing
industries;
Ln(Tariff): the natural logarithm of the weighted measure of input tariffs faced by down-
stream manufacturing industries;
HHI: the Herfindahl index of upstream industries;
SOE and FIE: the dummy variables for state-owned firms and foreign firms respectively;
Ln(Employment): the natural logarithm of employment of each firm;
Ln(Age) and Ln(Age2): the natural logarithm of firm age and its quadratic term;
Ln(Manufacturing-Barrier1) and Ln(Manufacturing-Barrier2): the natural logarithm of
two measures of foreign entry barrier in the upstream manufacturing sector faced by
downstream industries;
Ln(Services-Barrier1) and Ln(Services-Barrier2): the natural logarithm of two measures
of foreign entry barrier in the upstream services sector faced by downstream industries;
Ln(Distance): the natural logarithm of downstream industries’ distance to the world
technology frontier;
TS and LS: the technology sharing similarity and labour structure similarity between
upstream and downstream industries respectively;
R&D: a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm has R&D, and 0 otherwise;
Ln(Outsourcing): the natural logarithm of the ratio of intermediate inputs to firms’ total
output;
IV-India: India’s measure of anti-competitive regulations on product market from the
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OECD dataset;
Index: an index of the effect of 2002 reform on downstream industries;
Treatment: the treatment group dummy which is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the
treatment group, and 0 otherwise;
Post: a time dummy which takes the value of 1 for year 2002 and 2003, and 0 for year
2001;
Ln(BarrierUS): the natural logarithm of foreign entry barrier indicator where the weights
are using the US input-output coefficients;
Ln(TFPOP ): the natural logarithm of firms’ TFP based on the Olley and Pakes (1996)
approach;
Barrier3: the third measure of foreign entry barrier faced by downstream industries;
FER3: the third measure of foreign entry regulation in the manufacturing industries;
Foreign share (value added): the weighted share of foreign firms in total value added of
upstream industries;
Foreign share (employment): the weighted share of foreign firms in total employment of
upstream industries.
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